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FLORIDA'S NO-FAULT DIVORCE:
IS IT REALLY NO-FAULT?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1971 the Florida legislature passed the Dissolution of Marriage
Act.' This act purported to eliminate fault from Florida's divorce
system. The grounds for divorce under the old statute2 were replaced
by the "irretrievably broken" standard.3 Similarly, the previously
recognized defenses of recrimination, condonation, collusion, and
laches were abolished.4 Almost immediately the act was criticized
for vagueness; 5 most notably, it failed to define "irretrievably broken.
' '6
One critic has suggested that it would result in "divorce by consent
' ' 7
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 61.001-.20 (1975).
2. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-142; Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254 (§ 61.041).
3. FLA. STAT. § 61.052 (1975) provides:
(1) No judgment of dissolution of marriage shall be granted unless one of
the following facts appears, which shall be pleaded generally:
(a) The marriage is irretrievably broken.
(b) Mental incompetence of one of the parties ...
(2) Based on the evidence at the hearing, which evidence need not be
corroborated except to establish that the residence requirements of s. 61.021 are
met, the court shall dispose of the petition for dissolution of marriage as
follows, when the petition is based on the allegation that the marriage is
irretrievably broken:
(a) If there are no minor children of the marriage and if the respondent
does not, by answer to the petition for dissolution, deny that the marriage
is irretrievably broken, the court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of the
marriage if the court finds that the marriage is irretrievably broken.
(b) When there are minor children of the marriage, or when the respondent
denies by answer to the petition for dissolution that the marriage is irretrievably
broken, the court may:
1. Order either or both parties to consult with a marriage counselor,
psychologist, psychiatrist, minister, priest, rabbi, or any other person deemed
qualified by the court and acceptable to the party or parties ordered to seek
consultation; or
2. Continue the proceedings for a reasonable length of time not to exceed
3 months, to enable the parties themselves to effect a reconciliation; or
3. Take such other action as may be in the best interest of the parties and
the minor children of the marriage.
4. FLA. STAT. § 61.044 (1975).
5. Writing soon after the act's passage, Virginia Anne Church, a family law
attorney, described the act as "stick figure" drawn with a "hurried drafting pen."
Church, Faults in Florida No-Fault Divorce, 45 FLA. B. J. 568 (1971).
6. See id. at 569, 572. The author notes that the phrase "irretrievably broken" or
similar words have been used in other state acts; consequently, there was an existing
body of law interpreting such language at the time the Florida law was adopted.
For example, the California Code defined "irreconcilable differences" as "substantial
reasons for not continuing the marriage and which make it appear that the marriage
should be dissolved." CAL. CIv. CODE § 4507 (West 1970).
7. Murray, Family Law, 26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 566, 567, 572 (1972).
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and endanger social stability. The new act gave no indication of what
type or amount of evidence would be sufficient to show a broken
marriage. Moreover, it specifically eliminated the need for corrobora-
tion of the spouses' testimony.,
In the 5 years since the act was passed, the judiciary has had
time to deal with these ambiguities. The Supreme Court of Florida
has held that the act is constitutional" despite its lack of specificity.
The circuit courts10 and, to a lesser degree, the appellate courts" have
filled out the framework of the act.'
2
At this time, then, it seems appropriate to ask two questions. First,
is no-fault divorce desirable? Second, if it is, has Florida's new law, as
construed by the courts, actually eliminated fault as a consideration?
There are three areas where fault has traditionally been a factor in
the court's decision-granting a dissolution of marriage,13 awarding
alimony, 4 and granting child custody.' 5 Each area will be considered
independently in assessing the success of the new act.
8. FLA. STAT. § 61.052(2) (1973). The act does require corroboration to establish
that the petitioner has resided in the state for at least 6 months. Id.
9. Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973). The constitutionality of the act
was attacked on three grounds: (1) that it was too vague and indefinite to meet the
requirements of due process of law; (2) that it impaired the obligation of the marriage
contract, adversely affecting such property rights as the right to dower and potential
alimony; and (3) that its retroactive application was unconstitutional. The court held
that the statute was not vague and indefinite because it established guidelines which
met the test of "reasonable certainty." Id. at 271. The Ryan court also found that
marriage did not create the type of contract that was entitled to constitutional protec-
tion, id. at 269; that dower and potential alimony are inchoate rights and not property
rights within the protection of the constitution, id. at 369-70; and that the regulation of
marriage and divorce was a proper subject of the state's police power, id. at 273.
10. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 20. Under section 20(c)(3), the circuit courts are awarded
jurisdiction of all cases in equity.
11. It has always been the rule in Florida that the trial court in a divorce action
has a great deal of discretion. E.g., Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1976);
Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22, 24 (Fla. 1975). See also Oliver v. Oliver, 285 So. 2d 638,
640 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Hobbs v. Hobbs, 136 So. 2d 363, 365 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1962). In Grant v. Corbitt, 95 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1957), the supreme court recognized
the importance of intangible factors that do not appear in the record on appeal.
Under the new law, the rule is still valid that "neither the [supreme court] nor the
District Court can substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, absent a finding
of an abuse of discretion, which requires a lack of competent substantial evidence to
sustain the findings of the trial judge." 322 So. 2d at 24. Thus while the appellate
courts have established guidelines for interpretation of the new law, the real power
rests with the circuit courts.
12. See note 5 supra.
13. FLA. STAT. § 61.052 (1975).
14. FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1975).
15. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1975).
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II. PUBLIC POLICY-SHOULD FAULT BE A FACTOR?
Although the movement away from the fault system has been
slow,1 the system's numerous shortcomings have been apparent for
some time.17 The traditional adversary system, even in uncontested
divorces, has not proved workable. In many cases both parties have
the same interest-to end the marriage.18 In other cases, contesting
the divorce may be one spouse's method of punishing the other
spouse where the divorce is especially acrimonious. These contested
divorces are more likely to be denied.19 The absurd result is that
the most bitter and hopeless marriages will be perpetuated, 20 while
those in which the spouses can maintain at least a front of civility
will generally be ended.
One widely recognized problem is the encouragement of perjury
by the parties21 caused by the limitation of the grounds for divorce
to unilateral acts of fault. The spouses may fabricate an instance of
adultery or physical abuse.22 While collusion between husband and
wife is generally a defense to a divorce proceeding under a fault
statute,'2 it is practically impossible to prove unless one of the parties
16. California adopted no-fault in 1970 and was one of the first states to do so.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4506 (West 1970). In California a divorce is granted on the basis
of "irreconcilable differences, which have caused the irremediable breakdown of
the marriage." Id. That state's lead has been followed in many other states, but pro-
visions vary significantly. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (Supp. 1973) (ir-
retrievably broken); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-6 (Supp. 1971) (irretrievably broken);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-1-11.5-3 (Supp. 1975) (irretrievable breakdown); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 598.2 (Supp. 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-03 (Repl. 1971) (irreconcilable differences).
Some states have simply added a no-fault provision while retaining all the old fault
grounds. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-03 (Repl. 1971); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §
3.01-.07 (1975) (Texas grants a divorce on the basis of "insupportability" of the marriage,
cruelty, adultery, conviction of a felony, abandonment, living apart, and confinement in
a mental hospital.) Other states have eliminated fault in the divorce proceedings but
not in awarding alimony and child support. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 552.16
(1967). Michigan did not change its child custody provisions when it adopted a no-
fault standard for dissolution of marriage. Traditionally, the Michigan courts have
held the mother's conduct to be relevant in awarding custody. See, e.g., Kelso v. Kelso,
130 N.W.2d 418 (Mich. 1964); Fish v. Fish, 175 N.W.2d 343 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970).
17. Bradway, The Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11 TUL. L. REv. 377 (1937).
18. M. WHEELER, No-FAULT DIVORCE 6 (1974); 9 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED,
MATRIMONIAL, FAMILY, AND HEALTH LAWS 456 (1973).
19. WHEELER, supra note 18, at 8.
20. Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 38-39
(1966).
21. WHEELER, supra note 18, at 4-6, 8; 9 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED, MATRIMONIAL,
FAMILY, AND HEALTH LAWS 456 (1973).
22. WHEELER, supra note 18, at 5; Wadlington, supra note 20, at 33. Wadlington
states that in New York, where divorce has traditionally been hard to get, parties have
often staged instances of adultery to establish grounds for divorce. Id.
23. The defense was abolished in Florida by FLA. STAT. § 61.044 (1975).
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vacillates about wanting the divorce. 24 As a practical matter, the judges
and attorneys responsible for administering the system are parties
to this deceit; they are generally aware of the prevalence of perjury,
yet do little more than wink at its existence. This fact alone suggests
that the fault system has failed. The willingness of officers of the
court to countenance this hypocrisy cannot but breed disrespect for
the law and the courts.
25
If the fault system served its stated purposes-preserving marriages,
effecting amicable dissolution where reconciliation is impossible, and
protecting the children of the marriage2 8-its shortcomings might be
overlooked. However, the necessity of placing blame on one spouse
often leads to bitterness and rarely brings about a reconciliation. 27 It
produces vindictive testimony and makes the truth harder to deter-
mine. 2 Perhaps worst of all, it obscures the best interests of the
children and confuses those interests with the "morality" of the
parents.
29
The existence of fault laws in some states and no-fault in others
has encouraged the phenomenon of migratory divorces.30 The result
is discriminatory against low income families. While divorces are
readily available to wealthy citizens who can afford to establish a
domicile in a no-fault state, the poor must cope with the vicissitudes
of the fault system or resort to the "poor man's divorce"-desertion.' 1
The fault concept also fails to take account of our changing social
mores and lifestyles. One of the most basic changes has been in the
family unit itself. 2 At one time its primary goal was the production
of income and the necessities of life.33 Today fewer people work at
home; with more time available for recreation, a major role of the
family has become the satisfaction of its members' emotional needs.
34
This change has put stresses and pressures on the institution of
marriage that did not exist a century ago, but divorce laws have
24. WHEELER, supra note 18, at 7.
25. Id. at 8.
26. See FLA. STAT. § 61.001 (1975), which sets out the purposes of the statute.
27. See WHEELER, supra note 18, at 8; Bradway, supra note 17, at 385.
28. 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 127, 134 (1973).
29. WHEELER, supra note 18, at 76.
30. Id. at 10; Wadlington, supra note 20, at 34.
31. WHEELER, supra note 18, at 10. Wheeler also notes that the complexities of
fault laws make divorce more expensive, although possibly more lucrative for attorneys.
Thus, even where migratory divorce is not a problem, the fault system tends to dis-
criminate against the poor. See also Note, The No Fault Concept: Is This the Final
State in the Evolution of Divorce?, 47 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 959, 964 (1972).
32. See Bradway, supra note 17, at 382.
33. Tenney, Divorce Without Fault: The Next Step, 46 NEB. L. REV. 24, 48-49 (1967).
34. Id.
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only now begun to reflect this evolution. With the gradually changing
status of women 5 and the new role of the family unit, the no-fault
concept is more appropriate.38
The most fundamental flaw in the fault system is that it is based
on the myth that the breakup of a marriage can be attributed solely
to the acts of one spouse.3 7 With as many amorphous grounds for
divorce as most fault statutes contain,38 most spouses could be found
"guilty" in some respects. Even though one of the partners has
committed a specific act that is grounds for divorce, it may have been
provoked by the less obvious behavior of the other spouse.3 9 Thus the
fault system deals with manifestations of a broken marriage but is
inadequate to discern the causes.
The advantages of the no-fault concept are obvious. By eliminating
the need for placing blame, it may relieve the hostility between the
parties and increase the possibility for reconciliation. Yet it does not
necessarily lead to social instability by making divorce too easy to
obtain.40 Many no-fault statutes, including Florida's law4 1 and the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,4 2 call for counseling to effect a
35. This change has been recognized implicitly by the Florida legislature in providing
for rehabilitative alimony. See FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1975), which grants the court the
right to order payment of alimony to either party; see note 85 infra.
36. Bradway, supra note 17, at 384-85. The author notes that the community sanc-
tions against divorce are no longer as strong as they once were. Divorce is now accepted
as a reasonable solution to a moribund marriage. Id.
37. WHEELER, supra note 18, at 12; see generally Bradway, supra note 17.
38. Bradway, supra 17, at 383-84. An example of such a vague ground would be
the ground of extreme cruelty under the old Florida statute. F.A. STAT. § 61.041(4) (1969).
As the supreme court recognized in Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 270 (Fla. 1973),
'[e]xtreme cruelty' . . . was held ... to envision a great variety of faults and wrong-
doings ......
39. 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 127, 133 (1973).
40. Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 271 (Fla. 1973). Even if the divorce is uncontested,
the court is required to make an independent finding that the marriage is broken
based on evidence "beyond a petitioner's bare assertion." Id. at 272. See FLA. STAT. §
61.052(2)(a) (1975), which provides:
If there are no minor children of the marriage and if the respondent does
not, by answer to the petition for dissolution, deny that the marriage is ir-
retrievably broken, the court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of the marriage
if the court finds that the marriage is irretrievably broken. (emphasis added).
41. FLA. STAT. § 61.052(2)(b) (1975) provides in part:
When there are minor children of the marriage, or when the respondent
denies by answer to the petition for dissolution that the marriage is irretrievably
broken, the court may:
1. Order either or both parties to consult with a marriage counselor, psychologist,
psychiatrist, minister, priest, rabbi, or any other person deemed qualified by the
court and acceptable to the party or parties ordered to seek consultation ..
42. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 305(b) provides:
I If one of the parties has denied under oath or affirmation that the marriage
is irretrievably broken, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including
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reconciliation where it appears there is any hope of salvaging the
marriage. Moreover, a marriage that is beyond repair may have a
more severe emotional impact on the spouses and the children than
would a divorce.43 Thus it seems that the objectives of public policy
are best served by the no-fault system of divorce.
III. FAULT AND DISSOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE
Under the old statute, the primary area in which fault could be
considered was the dissolution itself. The new statute deletes all
reference to the old grounds of divorce,44 substituting therefor the
single criterion that the marriage be "irretrievably broken. '" 4 5 Although
this determination initially is made by the trial court, the Supreme
Court of Florida established guidelines in Ryan v. Ryan.4 "The new
statutory test for determining if a marriage is irretrievably broken is
simply whether for whatever reason or cause (no matter whose 'fault')
the marriage relationship is for all intents and purposes ended, no
longer viable, a hollow sham beyond hope of reconciliation or
repair.' ' 4 7 The court rejected the contention that the new law pro-
vided for an automatic decree of dissolution in uncontested pro-
ceedings.4 Instead, the court stated that "[alll of the surrounding facts
and circumstances ' ' 49 must be considered by the trial judge in exercising
his discretion.
5 0
While requiring some evidence of the breakdown, the Ryan court
did not state whether evidence of specific acts by one or both of the
parties would be necessary. In Riley v. Riley,51 the First District Court
the circumstances that gave rise to filing the petition and the prospect of reconcilia-
tion, and shall:
(1) make a finding whether the marriage is irretrievably broken; or
(2) continue the matter for further hearing . . . and may suggest to the
parties that they seek counseling.
43. See WitE, LER, supra note 18, at 17.
44. See FLA. STAT. § 61.052(1) (1975). Under the old statute, a divorce was granted
for impotence, adultery, extreme cruelty, a violent and ungovernable temper, intemperance
or drug addiction, desertion for one year, a previous divorce in another state or country,
a prior valid marriage, and under § 61.042, incurable insanity. FLA. STAT. § 61.041 (1969).
45. FLA. STAT. § 61.052(l)(a) (1975). Section 61.052(l)(b) grants a divorce if one of
the spouses is mentally incompetent.
46. 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973).
47. Id. at 271.
48. Id. However, under FLA. STAT. § 61.052(2) (1975), the evidence can be un-
corroborated.
49. 277 So. 2d at 271.
50. See FLA. STAT. § 61.052(2)(a) (1975).
51. 271 So. 2d 181 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1972). In Riley, the district court held
that the trial court was incorrect in "flatly dismissing" the husband's divorce petition
because his testimony was questioned. Id. at 184. The proper result in this type of situa-
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of Appeal addressed this issue, but refused to specify under what
circumstances a divorce should be granted.52 It found that "observable
acts and occurrences . .. are not as important or controlling as the
question of whether the mariage is in fact ended . . . ."53 In making
this determination, the standard to be used by the court is subjective
rather than objective.5 4 The Second District Court of Appeal took a
similar position in Nooe v. Nooe.5 5 In that case, no specific evidence
of fault was introduced. Instead, there was evidence that the parties
had lived separately for a number of years and that the husband had
previously filed a divorce action. 56 Although the wife denied that the
marriage was broken, each party admitted that marital difficulties
existed. The court admitted evidence that the parties had continued
sexual relations during their separation but held this alone did not
indicate reconciliation was possible.57 In Riley and Nooe the courts
did not consider such specific instances of fault as adultery, sexual
misconduct, or drunkenness; and under the new act there should
be no need for consideration of such behavior. In fact, for the court
to do so greatly increases the likelihood that such factors will influence
its decision.
When Florida's new statute was passed, many observers believed
the equitable defense of "clean hands" would still apply.5 The essence
of this defense is that a guilty party should not be allowed to take
advantage of his own wrongdoing in a court of equity. 59 Under Florida
law, the defense of recrimination was a part of the "clean hands"
tion would be the granting of a continuance to give the parties an opportunity to
effect a reconciliation. See FLA. STAT. § 61.052(2)(b)(2) (1975).
52. 271 So. 2d at 183. See also Oliver v. Oliver, 285 So. 2d 638, 640 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1973).
53. 271 So. 2d at 183. In dissent, Judge Spector suggested that the legislature
might have unwittingly established a standard more difficult to meet than that of
the old statute. He argued that behavior which would clearly have been extreme
cruelty under the fault system might not suffice to prove that a marriage was beyond
repair. Id. at 185. In general, his fears have proven to be unfounded, but because of
the broad discretionary powers granted to trial judges, his suggestion should not be
totally disregarded. Even with the guidelines established by the Ryan court, there is
disconcerting latitude for varying and possibly contradictory interpretations of "ir-
retrievable breakdown."
54. 271 So. 2d at 183. See also FLORIDA FAMILY LAW § 21.10 (1972).
55. 277 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
56. id. at 837.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., FLORIDA FAMILY LAW § 21.13 (1972).
59. See Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 276 (Fla. 1973) (Roberts, J., dissenting);
Stewart v. Stewart, 29 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 1947); Spencer v. Spencer, 193 So. 2d 40 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
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doctrine.80 The Supreme Court of Florida held in Ryan v. Ryan6 1
that "the clean hands principle has been eliminated in marriage
dissolution except for fraud and deceit which are always available.... ,,62
It found that this result was required by the specific elimination of
old defenses by the new act. 63 Notwithstanding a strong dissent in
Ryan by Justice Roberts, 64 the "clean hands" doctrine no longer
appears to be a viable defense to a divorce action.65 To permit such
a defense would clearly nullify the effectiveness of no-fault divorce-
the doctrine would require a return to assessing relative fault and
innocence, and proof of fault would necessitate introducing evidence
of specific instances of wrongdoing.
Under the old statute, application of the related doctrines of
recrimination and "clean hands" resulted in the denial of many divorces
even though reconciliation was not a realistic expectation. 6 This is
no longer true under the new statute. Where minor children are
involved or where one spouse contests the dissolution, the trial court
has several alternatives to decreeing dissolution or dismissing with
prejudice. The court may order either or both of the parties to
consult with a counselor;67 it may continue the proceedings for a
period not exceeding three months "to enable the parties themselves
to effect a reconciliation"; 8 or it may take any other action which it
deems to be in the best interests of the parties and their children.69
If the evidence shows the marriage is actually broken, however, the
trial court must grant the divorce; failure to do so is an abuse of
60. Stewart v. Stewart, 29 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1947).
61. 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973).
62. Id. at 272.
63. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 61.044 (1975).
64. 277 So. 2d at 276-78. Justice Roberts argued that the "clean hands" doctrine was
so well established as a part of divorce law in Florida that the legislature could not
have intended to abolish it simply by taking away the old defense of recrimination.
65. See De La Portilla v. De La Portilla, 287 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1973).
66. In Carlson v. Carlson, 144 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962), the district
court held that the trial court correctly applied the doctrine of recrimination to deny
both the husband and wife a divorce where the evidence indicated that both parties
were guilty of extreme cruelty. An application of the "clean hands" doctrine by the
court in Devlin v. Devlin, 24 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1946), led to the same result when an
adulterous husband petitioned the court for a divorce. As the court noted in Stewart
v. Stewart, 29 So. 2d 247, 248-49 (Fla. 1947), however, neither doctrine is absolute,
and it is within the court's discretion to grant a divorce despite the wrongdoing of
the petitioner. See also Busch v. Busch, 68 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1953).
67. FLA. STAT. § 61.052(2)(b)(1) (1975).
68. FLA. STAT. § 61.052(2)(b)(2) (1975).
69. FLA. STAT. § 61.052(2)(b)(3) (1975).
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discretion.70 In Nelms v. Nelms, 71 the district court reversed the lower
court's order that the parties seek marriage counseling.
72
At final hearing the wife testified the marriage was irretrievably
broken because she no longer loved her husband and could not live
with him. Further inquiry developed that he had physically abused
her during the marriage and that he paid little or no attention
to their children; that they had spent untold hours discussing their
problems, always without success; that she had suffered mental
and physical abuse from him she would never forget; that he had
sued her once before for divorce.7 3
Based on this evidence, the district court held that a decree of divorce
was the only solution.
In the area of dissolution of marriage, the new Florida law
compares favorably with the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.
74
The Uniform Act, like the Florida statute, requires a finding that
the marriage is "irretrievably broken"; unlike Florida, it provides
specific guidelines to aid the trial court in making this determination.
75
The Florida law, however, has proved effective in eliminating the con-
sidcation of fault, at least in the area of dissolution. Appellate court
decisions have now defined the irretrievably broken standard7 6 and
70. Carrigan v. Carrigan, 283 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Riley v.
Riley, 271 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
71. 285 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
72. Id. See also Carrigan v. Carrigan, 283 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
73. 285 So. 2d at 50.
74. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 302 (1973 amendment).
75. Id. Section 302 provides in part:
(a) The [Circuit] court shall enter a decree of dissolution of marriage if:
(2) the court finds that the marriage is irretrievably broken, if the finding
is supported by evidence that (i) the parties have lived separate and apart for
a period of more than 180 days next preceding the commencement of the pro-
ceeding, or (ii) there is serious marital discord adversely affecting the attitude
of one or both of the parties toward the marriage;
(3) the court finds that the conciliation provisions of Section 305 either do
not apply or have been met ....
Id. Section 305 provides in relevant part:
(b) If one of the parties has denied under oath or affirmation that the
marriage is irretrievably broken, the court shall consider all relevant factors,
including the circumstances that gave rise to filing the petition and the prospect
of reconciliation, and shall:
(1) make a finding whether the marriage is irretrievably broken; or
(2) continue the matter for further hearing ... and may suggest to the parties
that they seek counseling.
76. Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 271 (Fla. 1973) (The new statutory test for
determining whether a marriage is irretrievably broken is whether "the marriage re-
lationship is for all intents and purposes ended, no longer viable, a hollow sham
NO-FAULT DIVORCE
have eliminated the need to show specific instances of fault before
the marriage will be dissolved.7
This has been accomplished without creating a system of "divorce
by consent." The Supreme Court of Florida has held there must
be some evidence to support a finding by the trial court that the
marriage is beyond repair,78 albeit uncorroborated.7 1 If there are minor
children or if the divorce is contested, the trial judge has been granted
a great deal of discretion to attempt a reconciliation between the
parties.80
IV. FAULT IN AWARDING ALIMONY
While fault has been effectively eliminated as a factor in granting
or denying a divorce in Florida, the same cannot be said about awarding
alimony. There still appears to be some uncertainty about the
relevance of fault to alimony awards. In states that consider fault,
an alimony award resembles a damage award to the injured spouse.81
Punishment of the "guilty" spouse8 2 in this manner fails to recognize
that both spouses generally share the blame,82 and that a specific act
of one spouse may have been precipitated by the equally reprehensible
but less overt behavior of the other.8 4
Alimony should be based on the spouses' respective needs and
abilities to pay. 5 The state's interest in this regard should be in assuring
that its citizens are supported and do not become wards of the state,
not in punishing one of the parties. Apparently it was the legislature's
intent to further this purpose in providing that the trial court could
"consider any factor necessary to do equity and justice between the
beyond hope of reconciliation or repair."). See Riley v. Riley, 271 So. 2d 181, 183 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
77. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 285 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Carrigan
v. Carrigan, 283 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Nooe v. Nooe, 277 So. 2d
835 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Riley v. Riley, 271 So. 2d 181, 183 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
78. Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 271-72 (Fla. 1973).
79. See FLA. STAT. § 61.052(2) (1975).
80. FLA. STAT. § 61.052(2)(b) (1975).
81. See 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 127, 133 (1973).
82. WHEELER, supra note 18, at 56.
83. See Bradway, supra note 17; WHEELER, supra note 18, at 12.
84. 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 127, 133 (1973). See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
85. Florida's new law implicitly recognizes these factors as the basis for awarding
alimony. Under FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1) (1975), alimony may be granted to either spouse,
rather-than just the wife, as was the. case under the old law. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254
(§ 61.08). Just as significant is the change providing for rehabilitative alimony. This
means that the spouse will receive alimony payments only to the extent that, and as
long as, they are necessary. Under this concept, the trial judge must consider such
factors as the health, educational background, and employment potential of the
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parties."8 6 But while the legislature seems to have been referring to
the financial equities, 7 the courts in awarding alimony have broadly
interpreted this language to allow them to consider any misconduct
of the spouses. s8 In Oliver v. Oliver,9 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal voiced this interpretation when it said: "The equities, cir-
cumstances and the whole marital picture furnish and form the fabric
from which the award is to be cut, and if the court limits itself
solely to the economics of the matter, it deprives itself of valuable
factors that may aid in doing justice to the problem." 90 The Oliver
court, noting certain similarities between the old and new statutes,
found that earlier case law was still applicable under the new law.91
This illustrates one of the dangers of failure to make the no-fault
concept explicit in the area of alimony.92 Judges steeped in case law
which developed under the fault system may find it difficult to
change old attitudes and biases, especially without an express mandate
from the legislature.
In contrast to the statute's vague reference to "any factor necessary
to do equity and justice," 93 the act deals specifically with the treatment
of adultery. Unlike the old statute, which stated that "no alimony
shall be granted to an adulterous wife, ' ' 94 the new statute provides
only that it is within the court's discretion to consider adultery by a
spouse in awarding alimony to that spouse.95
By allowing a court to consider adultery as a factor in alimony
determinations, the statute undermines the theory of no-fault divorce.
spouse requesting alimony. See generally Barrett v. Barrett, 305 So. 2d 260, 261 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719, 724-26 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1974), cert. denied, 307 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1975); Baker v. Baker, 299 So. 2d 138, 141 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 307 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1975).
86. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2) (1975).
87. O'Flarity, Financial and Property Aspects of Dissolution of Marriage, FLORIDA
CONFERENCE ON MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY UNIT 64 (1975) (limited publication).
88. See Pro v. Pro, 300 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Oliver v. Oliver,
285 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
89. 285 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
90. Id. at 640. See also Pro v. Pro, 300 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
91. 285 So. 2d at 640. FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1969) provides in part: "[T]he court
shall make such orders about . . . alimony . . . as from the circumstances of the
parties and nature of the case is equitable .... "
92. See Church, supra note 5, at 572. In discussing a similar problem in the area
of child custody, the author notes that "[s]hort of neurosurgery, it is doubtful that
habitual thinking of circuit or appellate courts will change greatly." But see Brown
v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719, 723-24 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974), quoting Kahn v. Kahn,
78 So. 2d 367, 368 (Fla. 1955).
93. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2) (1975).
94. FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1969). See also FLORIDA FAMILY LAw § 22.38 (1972).
95. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1) (1975).
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Adulterous conduct is not relevant to either the ability of one spouse
to pay or the needs of the other spouse for support. Florida courts
have reached different results as to the admission of evidence of
adultery, seemingly dependent on whether the evidence is offered to
reduce the award to the "guilty" spouse 6 or increase the award to
the "innocent" spouse.
9 7
The Third District Court of Appeal in Stafford v. Stafford9s held
that it was an abuse of discretion by the trial court to refuse to allow
a party to introduce evidence of adultery in mitigation of alimony.99
When the evidence has been presented, the court may refuse to con-
sider it in making the award, 10 but it cannot entirely exclude such
evidence.' 0' Thus, while the Stafford court did not require that the
wife's claim for alimony be defeated, or even limited by her adultery,
it did require that the evidence be heard despite the fact that her
conduct had no bearing on either her needs or her husband's ability
to pay. In effect, then, the trial judge has the authority to punish a
wife if he is offended by her conduct.
Apparently the third district would not apply this rule where the
petitioner was seeking to increase his or her award of alimony by
presenting evidence of the other partner's adultery. Thus, in Escobar
v. Escobar,102 the district court affirmed the lower court's holding that
evidence of the husband's adultery was not relevant in awarding
alimony to the wife. Instead, the court stated that alimony should be
based on the needs and financial situations of the parties.1°3
While the language of the statute'04 supports both the Stafford and
Escobar decisions, the results of the two cases remain inconsistent.
Under a true no-fault system, the result in Escobar would be desirable.
All evidence that is irrelevant to need and ability to pay should be
96. See Stafford v. Stafford, 294 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
303 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1974).
97. See Escobar v. Escobar, 300 So. 2d 702, 703 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
98. 294 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 303 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1974).
99. Id. at 27.
100. Id. See also Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 265 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1972), cert. denied, 273 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1973).
101. This rule has also been adopted by the fourth district. See note 88 supra.
102. 300 So. 2d 702, 703 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
103. Id.
104. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1) (1975) provides:
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant alimony to
either party, which alimony may be rehabilitative or permanent in nature ...
The court may consider the adultery of a spouse and the circumstances thereof
in determining whether alimony shall be awarded to such spouse and the amount
of alimony, if any, to be awarded to such spouse.
1976]
516 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.4:504
excluded. A contrary result increases the danger that fault will be a
determining factor in awarding alimony.
The new no-fault law does not eliminate fault as a consideration
in awarding alimony and apparently was not intended by the legislature
to do so. It specifically allows the consideration of a spouse's adultery
in determining whether alimony should be awarded to that spouse' 05
and has been construed by the courts to allow consideration of other
types of misconduct.1 0 As the court in Oliver recognized, "it would
be desirable to make the whole marriage dissolution procedure
pleasurable and non-abrasive.'10 7 Retention of the element of fault
under the present law does not foster this goal. One consequence
of admitting evidence of misconduct on the part of one of the
spouses in an alimony determination is the nullification of most of
the salutary results achieved in the area of dissolution. The pro-
ceedings become acrimonious; any chance of reconciliation, or at
least reasonable agreement between the parties, is diminished; the
incentive for perjury is increased; and the divorce proceeding again
becomes a forum for assessing fault and meting out punishment.
V. FAULT IN GRANTING CHILD CUSTODY
Child custody is the third area in which fault may be a considera-
tion. Ideally, the "best interests of the child" should be the primary-
perhaps the only-factor taken into account by the court.108 The moral
behavior of the parent may or may not affect these interests. If there
is an effect, however, it should be evident from the behavior of the
child at school and at home, his emotional adjustment, and other such
manifestations. Only rarely should the presentation of evidence of
specific instances of parental "immorality" be necessary.
This may be especially applicable when dealing with the sexual
behavior of the parents. A determination of the best interests of the
child is an area where unpredictability is the general rule. Trial
judges have broad discretionary powers'0 9 and cannot help but be in-
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Stafford v. Stafford, 294 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974);
Ruhnau v. Ruhnau, 299 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Pro v. Pro, 300 So. 2d
288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
107. 285 So. 2d at 640.
108. E.g., Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975); Blue v. Blue, 66 So. 2d 228
(Fla. 1953); Ebaugh v. Ebaugh, 282 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Brust v.
Brust, 266 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Green v. Green, 254 So. 2d 860
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
109. E.g., Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975); Grant v. Corbitt, 95 So. 2d
25 (Fla. 1957); Ebaugh v. Ebaugh, 282 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Tagliarini
v. Tagliarini, 213 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
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fluenced by their personal beliefs. Changing concepts of morality have
had varying effects on trial judges; but, as the dissenting judge in
Ebaugh v. Ebaugh"° recognized, what constitutes immoral sexual con-
duct is largely a matter of "private conviction."11'
As passed in 1971, section 61.13, Florida Statutes, contained no
explicit provisions authorizing or restricting the consideration of
parental misconduct. It stated that the court should make such order
"as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case
is equitable. "11 2 During the 1975 legislative session, section 61.13 was
amended; 1"3 it now specifies a number of factors the trial court must
consider in evaluating the best interests of the child, including the
moral fitness of the parents." 4 It is not immediately clear what effect
this revision will have on developing case law.
Under the 1971 law, case law developed the rule that evidence of
the adultery of one parent, while relevant in a child custody pro-
ceeding, was not alone sufficient to deprive the parent of custody." 5
110. 282 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
111. Id. at 16 (Walden, J., dissenting).
112. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1975).
113. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-99.
114. FA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (1975) provides:
For purposes of custody, the best interests of the child shall be determined by
the court's consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting the best welfare
and interests of the child, including, but not limited to:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the
parents and child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parents to give the child love,
affection, and guidance and to continue the educating of the child.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted
under the laws of this state in lieu of medical care, and other material
needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environ-
ment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home.
(f) The moral fitness of the parents.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parents.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a
preference.
(j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute.
115. Smothers v. Smothers, 281 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1973). In Smothers, while the court
noted that adultery alone was not a sufficient reason to modify a child custody order, it
found that the man practically lived with the mother, that a sexual relationship was
carried on under the same roof where the children lived, that the man physically
disciplined the children, and that he got into arguments when the father visited. On
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This rule, however, still leaves the trial judge tremendous latitude
to interject his own biases. One of the most blatant examples of abuse
of this discretion can be found in Ebaugh v. Ebaugh.116 There the
husband petitioned the trial court for modification of a decree awarding
custody of their child to his wife. The circuit court held in favor of
the father, and the district court affirmed in a brief opinion that made
no mention of the facts."17 From the dissenting opinion, however, it
appears that the basis for the trial judge's decision to award the father
custody was the wife's sexual conduct. The wife had had sexual rela-
tions with two men after her divorce. There was no showing that
her behavior had adversely affected the child; in fact, the evidence
indicated the child's behavior and outlook had improved. On these
facts alone, it would appear that the father failed to meet his burden
of proof in showing changed circumstances that would justify modifica-
tion.1 8 Moreover, the trial court failed to consider evidence that the
husband had engaged in the same type of sexual behavior as the
wife. Apparently the judge felt such conduct was more reprehensible
in the wife than in the husband. As recognized by the dissent in
Ebaugh, depriving a parent of custody can be a judge's way of punishing
nonconforming behavior.1 9
Far too often, the court's inquiry stops at the parents' activities
and does not reach the effects, if any, on the child. In Goodman v.
Goodman,'20 for example, the appellate court noted evidence that the
mother's home was untidy, that she used profanity with the children
and the babysitters, that she was carrying on a sexual relationship in
her home, and that a small quantity of marijuana was found in her
home; but it never questioned the effect of this on the children.
Dinkel v. Dinkel,121 handed down by the Supreme Court of Florida
after section 61.13 was amended, specifically deals with the issue of
a parent's moral fitness and its relevance to child custody. The trial
the basis of all these factors, the court modified the custody order. See also Farrow v.
Farrow, 263 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972). This was also true under the old
statute. Anderson v. Anderson, 205 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967); McAnespie
v. McAnespie, 200 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
116. 282 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
117. The traditional reluctance on the part of Florida's appellate courts to reverse
the trial courts, see note 11 supra, which is evident in the majority's holding in Ebaugh,
serves to compound the possible abuse of discretion by the trial court.
118. See Teta v. Teta, 297 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974). That court found
that a trial court does not have "the same degree of discretion as it does in entering
the original decree. ... The burden of proof is on the party seeking to modify the
decree.
119. 282 So. 2d at 16 (Walden, J., dissenting).
120. 291 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
121. 322 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975).
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court had awarded custody of the 3-year-old child to his mother, but
the decision was reversed by the First District Court of Appeal 122 on
the grounds that the mother was morally unfit. The evidence showed
that the wife had been having an affair with a co-worker while her
husband was overseas in the armed forces. 1 23 The supreme court
quashed the decision of the district court, holding that the trial judge
had not abused his discretion. 124 The supreme court stated:
Adultery may or may not have a direct bearing on the welfare
of a child of tender years .... Where the trier of fact determines
that the spouse's adultery does not have any bearing on the wel-
fare of the child, the act of adultery should not be taken into
consideration in reaching the question of custody of the child.12 5
While the Dinkel decision expresses some approval of limiting the
consideration of adultery in child custody determinations, it does not
go far enough. In essence, it does nothing more than restate the rule
that existed in Florida prior to the 1975 amendment. The opinion in
no way lessens the discretionary powers of the trial court; it may
actually have the opposite effect. Although recognizing that adultery
may well have no bearing on a child's welfare, the court did nothing
to shift the emphasis from the parents' behavior to the child's best
interests. Today Florida courts do little more than pay lip service
to the "best interests of the child." In its treatment of child custody,
the Florida law falls short of the Uniform Act's provision which
specifically requires that the court "shall not consider conduct of a
proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child. '' 126
In addition, the Uniform Act lists a number of factors that should be
influential in determining the "best interest of the child," including
the wishes of both child and parents, the child's social adjustment,
and the health of all those involved. 127 Even under the Uniform Act
122. Dinkel v. Dinkel, 305 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
123. 322 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1975).
124. Id. at 24.
125. Id. at 23-24.
126. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402. Compare FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (1975).
See note 114 supra for text.
127. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402 provides:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the
child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the
child's best interest;
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there is room for the judge to exercise discretion. The judge's first
concern, however, should be the relationship between parent and
child; if that is found to be satisfactory, there is no justification for
an inquiry into the parent's conduct.
VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The new Florida no-fault divorce law does not live up to its
name. While it has been effective in the limited area of dissolution,
this success must be set off against its failure in the areas of alimony
and child custody. The problems that arise under a fault system cannot
be cured by partially abolishing the fault element. The abolition must
be total.
A number of statutory amendments are necessary to achieve this
goal. First, and most important, the fault concept must be explicitly
and absolutely removed from every part of the existing statute. It is
not sufficient to leave this determination to courts which have not
been weaned from the old system. Specifically, all mention of adultery
should be deleted from section 61.08, concerning alimony. Similarly,
section 61.13(3), dealing with child custody, should be further amended
to remove any reference to the moral fitness of the parents.
The trial judge's discretionary powers should be limited by
establishing clear guidelines for the types of evidence admissible at
trial 2 and rules excluding evidence of marital misconduct. 129 This
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not
affect his relationship to the child.
The Florida statute also states certain factors that the trial judge should consider. FLA.
STAT. § 61.13(3) (1975). See note 114 supra for text.
128. See O'Flarity, supra note 87, at 75. O'Flarity lists the following factors
recommended by the Family Law Section of the Florida Bar for consideration by the
trial court:
(1) Duration of the marriage;
(2) Contribution of each party to the acquisition of property;
(3) Contribution of each party to the marriage including but not limited to services
rendered in homemaking, child rearing, education, career and job building of the other
spouse;
(4) The loss of dower, curtesy, statutory share, or inheritance rights, in the property
of the other party, and the loss of protection from insurance coverage and the loss of
pension rights, social security benefits and similar advantages;
(5) Whether the parties have filed joint income tax returns or other tax advantages
have accrued from the marriage;
(6) Whether the property was acquired after a decree of legal separation or while
the parties were living separate and apart due to marital difficulties;
(7) Financial contributions made to the property acquired during the marriage;
(8) Financial contributions made to the marriage by the parties.
129. Id. at 76. See Note, supra note 31, at 971.
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requires a delicate balancing of competing interests; while a judge must
be restricted in imposing his personal judgments and prejudices on
the system, many of the decisions made in a divorce proceeding require
a subjective assessment of intangible factors that may not be obvious
in the record on appeal. With this in mind, it would be in the best
interest of all parties to make evidence of specific acts of misconduct
inadmissible. Any relevance which such evidence might have to award-
ing alimony or granting child custody is outweighed by the prejudicial
effect it could have on the judge's determination.
Closely related to this issue is the need to clearly establish the factors
that should be considered by the court. 130 The legislature has already
taken this step with regard to child custody,131 and the guidelines
set out in the relevant legislation are similar to the criteria of the
Uniform Act. 3 2 In the area of alimony, a revision of section 61.08(2),
Florida Statutes, is necessary. The ambiguity of this section has pro-
vided the means for the judiciary to invoke the old standards of
the fault system. A desirable amendment might state that the criteria
for awarding alimony are the needs and resources of the parties,
which would eliminate the element of punishment. Specifically, the
court should be directed to consider the relative financial status of
each party; their respective potential earning powers based on numerous
factors such as educational background, age, health, and past ex-
perience; and their financial needs.
In child custody proceedings, an independent attorney should be
appointed to protect the best interests of the child."' To some extent,
this would avoid the problems raised when hostile and vindictive
parents use a custody fight to accuse each other of misconduct. In
this same vein, an impartial determination of the child's interests
might be aided by requiring the judge to make use of investigative
reports from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. 3 4
130. See O'Flarity, supra note 87.
131. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (1975). See note 114 supra for text.
132. Compare FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1975) with UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE Acr
§ 402. See notes 114 and 126, respectively, for text.
133. Note, supra note 31, at 975; Church, supra note 5, at 573.
134. See FLA. STAT. § 61.20 (1975). Under this section, the judge has the option
to request such a report but is not required to do so. See Church, supra note 5, at 573. The
constitutionality of FLA. STAT. § 61.20 (1975) was upheld by the Supreme Court of
Florida in Kern v. Kern, 33 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1976). In Kern, a mother who had been
denied custody of her children challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the
grounds that it violated due process and infringed on her right to confront witnesses.
Recognizing the importance of professional assistance to judges and the value of an
independent source of information, the court held that the use of outside reports
is not unconstitutional where a copy is furnished to the attorneys for each party.
See id. at 20-21.
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This would necessitate the establishment of some guidelines for the
division's investigators to assure that the fault element does not re-
appear in their reports to the judge. The obvious difficulty with the
latter suggestions-appointment of an attorney for the child and ex-
panded reliance on outside reports-is the financial burden their
implementation would place on either the state or the parents.
The statutory remedies are necessary as a first step, but in the
long run a large scale reorganization of the entire family law field is
desirable. It is not within the scope of this note to deal with this
possibility in any depth, but a few suggestions are offered. The establish-
ment of a "family court" system which would handle all aspects of
family law should be contemplated.1 3 5 Ideally, it should be coordinated
with a counseling service which would be available to parties seeking
counseling under section 61.052(2)(b)(1) and other statutes. Special
training in the areas of psychology and sociology should be required
for judges sitting on this court. Hopefully, such a system would reduce
the vagaries and inconsistencies in present divorce decisions. The
legislature can and should take a concrete first step by undertaking a
thorough revision of the existing divorce law with the goal of achieving
a true no-fault system in Florida.
MARY F. CLARK
135. See generally Fall, Implementation of a Family Court in Dade County, FLORIDA
CONFERENCE ON MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY UNIT 105 (1975) (limited publication).
